




S E C R E T // N O F O R N // 20311208

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO  
U.S. NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA  
APO AE 09360



JTF-GTMO-CDR

8 December 2006

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 91st Avenue,  
Miami, FL 33172

SUBJECT: Combatant Status Review Tribunal Input and Recommendation for Continued  
Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee Ammar al-Baluchi, ISN: US9PK-  
010018DP (S)

### JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment

1. (S//NF) **Personal Information:**

- JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: Ammar al-Baluchi
- Aliases and Current/True Name: Mustafa al-Baluchi, Ali Abd al-Aziz Ali, Mohammad Ali, Amanullah, Habib, Jammy
- Place of Birth: al-Ahmadi, Kuwait (KU)
- Date of Birth: 29 August 1977
- Citizenship: Kuwait
- Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9PK-010018DP



2. (U//FOUO) **Health:** Detainee is in good health.

3. (S//NF) **JTF-GTMO Assessment:**

a. (S) **Recommendation:** JTF-GTMO recommends this detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD).

b. (S//NF) **Executive Summary:** Detainee is a senior member and planner of al-Qaida as well as the nephew of al-Qaida military leader Khalid Shaykh Mohammed (KSM). Under KSM's direction, detainee helped plan and facilitate al-Qaida operations and personnel,

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including the travel of 9/11 hijackers to the United States (US). He is affiliated with numerous other senior leaders of al-Qaida including Usama Bin Laden (UBL), Jemaah Islamiya (JI)<sup>1</sup> leader Riduan bin Isomuddin aka (Hambali), Sayf al-Adl, Walid bin Attash aka (Khallad), Shaykh Said al-Masri, Hamza Zubayr and others. Detainee helped facilitate the travel and finances for at least 13 of the 9/11 hijackers as they left the United Arab Emirates (UAE) for the US. He was also involved in numerous plots targeting the US and other western assets, and acted as a liaison for messages and money for KSM and Indonesian al-Qaida leaders.<sup>2</sup> He is also responsible for arranging the evacuation of al-Qaida fighters and families fleeing Afghanistan (AF). **[ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ABOUT THIS DETAINEE IS AVAILABLE IN AN SCI SUPPLEMENT.]** JTF-GTMO has determined this detainee to be:

- A **HIGH** risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies.
- A **MEDIUM** threat from a detention perspective.
- Of **HIGH** intelligence value.

#### 4. (S//NF) Detainee's Account of Events:

**The following section is based on a consolidation of several accounts from various significant individuals in order to assemble a feasible timeline.**

**a. (S//NF) Prior History:** In 1985 or 1986, detainee left Kuwait to attend the Umrah (minor hajj) in Saudi Arabia (SA). In 1988, detainee, his immediate family and other relatives moved to Iran (IR) while his father stayed to continue working in the Kuwaiti Ministry of the Hajj. In 1993, while attending boarding school in Zahedan, IR, Ramzi Yousef's<sup>3</sup> family contacted detainee to let him know that Ramzi would be staying in Zahedan for eye surgery. From 1996 to 1998, detainee traveled to Karachi, Pakistan (PK), where he acquired his Microsoft certification online from the US, but took the required classes at the Universal Computer Institute in Karachi. He also attended computer classes in Karachi at Petroman Electronics Institute and at a unidentified third school. It was during this time that he became interested in attending jihad training. In August 1998, after graduating from school, his father directed him to find employment in the UAE.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Analyst Note: Jemaah Islamiya is a Tier 1 target. Tier 1 targets are defined as terrorist groups, especially those with state support, that have demonstrated the intention and the capability to attack US persons or interests.

<sup>2</sup> TD-314/61768-03

<sup>3</sup> Analyst Note: Ramzi Yousef is the 1993 World Trade Center bomber.

<sup>4</sup> TD-314/52606-05, Analyst Note: Within this document there seems to be an error on the dates for his arrival in the UAE. It was originally stated as 5 June 1998; however, later in the document it is labeled as 5 August 1998.

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**b. (S//NF) Recruitment and Travel:** Detainee stated that he was "self-recruited," for jihad having been inspired by the martyrdom of KSM's brother Asim and by hearing Ramzi Yousef speak about jihad in Iran.<sup>5</sup> Detainee became more interested in joining the jihad after he left Iran in 1996 through his exposure to Arab culture and ideology in Pakistan and the UAE.<sup>6</sup> While in Pakistan, detainee expressed interest in obtaining militant training from the camps in Afghanistan but could not fit the training around his studies. He felt he would not be very successful with the training so instead, he offered his services to his uncle, KSM, who used him to facilitate the activities of the 9/11 hijackers.<sup>7</sup>

**c. (S//NF) Training and Activities:** At the end of 1999, KSM requested detainee to transfer funds to 9/11 hijacker, Nawaf al-Hazmi, in the US. From 1999 to their ultimate mission in 2001, detainee helped facilitate 13 of the 9/11 hijackers' travel, obtaining visas, setting up bank accounts, and providing for their lodging in the UAE prior to leaving for the US. During 2000, detainee also met and facilitated Mustafa Ahmad al-Hawsawi aka (Zahir), an al-Qaida financial manager, and Ramzi bin al-Shibh, originally intended to be a 9/11 hijacker, but he was not able to obtain a US entry visa.<sup>8</sup> After detainee's company closed their business in the UAE, detainee's UAE visa was revoked and he traveled to Pakistan and then on to Afghanistan "looking for training." After the fall of the Taliban in November 2001, detainee assisted KSM in organizing the movement of al-Qaida operatives and their families to safe houses in Pakistan. In December 2001, detainee arranged e-mail accounts and travel arrangements for shoe bombers Richard Reid and Issa al-Britani<sup>9</sup> aka (Dhiren Barot) aka (Abu Issa al-Hindi) aka (Sajid Badat).<sup>10</sup> In late December 2001, detainee planned an operation to attack a military base in Quetta, PK.<sup>11</sup> In January 2002, various senior al-Qaida leaders began to arrive in Karachi. From March to April 2002, "dirty bombers" Jose Padilla and Binyam Mohammed arrived in Karachi and detainee scheduled their travel and set up communications with them. From May to June 2002, detainee and Hamza Zubayr began plotting to carry out simultaneous attacks in Karachi against the US Consulate, western residences, and westerners at the local airport. On 11 September 2002, raids were conducted on the houses of Hamza Zubayr and Ramzi bin al-Shibh in the Defense Area of

<sup>5</sup> TD-314/55133-05

<sup>6</sup> TD-314/14271-05

<sup>7</sup> TD-314/52606-05, TD-314/55133-05

<sup>8</sup> TD-314/52606-05

<sup>9</sup> NEWS WIRE - AP - 09-AUG-2004, Analyst Note: This article sourced KU-010010 as stating that KU-010010 sent Issa al-Britani to Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, in late 1999 or early 2000 to meet with ID-010019. This is also when, in January 2000, the leaders met at the home of Yazid Sufaat to plan the 9/11 attacks and the USS Cole attack. On 16 January 2002, a US federal grand jury indicted Richard Reid on nine counts, including use of a weapon of mass destruction and attempted murder.

<sup>10</sup> TD-314/08201-04

<sup>11</sup> Analyst note: This operation did not come to fruition.

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Karachi; Zubayr was killed and Ramzi bin al-Shibh was captured. After the raids, plans for further operations stopped until October 2002. Detainee's activities centered on the development of the plot of simultaneous attacks in Karachi, PK, from October until his capture in April 2003.<sup>12</sup>

**5. (S//NF) Capture Information:**

a. (S//NF) On 30 April 2003 in Karachi, the Pakistani Intelligence Bureau and a team of Pakistani rangers captured detainee along with senior terrorist planner Walid bin Attash and four other suspected al-Qaida members.<sup>13</sup> According to reporting, local authorities also seized 150 kg of high explosives and detonators during the raid.<sup>14</sup>

**b. (S) Property Held:**

- (S//NF) A pink perfume bottle filled with a trace amount (less than ¼ oz.) of potassium cyanide poison<sup>15</sup> (Not held by JTF-GTMO)

c. (S) **Transferred to JTF-GTMO:** 4 September 2006

d. (S//NF) **Reasons for Transfer to JTF-GTMO:** Detainee was transferred to JTF-GTMO to face prosecution for terrorist activities against the United States.

**6. (S//NF) Detainee Threat:**

a. (S) **Assessment:** Detainee is assessed to be a HIGH risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies.

b. (S//NF) **Reasons for Continued Detention:** Detainee is a senior member and planner of al-Qaida who facilitated the travel and funding of 13 of the 9/11 hijackers. Detainee participated in attack planning against US and western targets and is affiliated with significant senior al-Qaida and JI personnel. Detainee facilitated the transfer of funds from al-Qaida to JI for operational purposes, assisted in the creation of al-Qaida media

<sup>12</sup> TD-314/52606-05, TD-314/08201-04

<sup>13</sup> NCIS MTAC SAR TERR-106-120-2003, HQDA SITREP #596 OPERATIONS ONE OEF OIF

<sup>14</sup> TD-314/25273-03, STRATCOM INTSUM 01 MAY 2003. Analyst Note: STRATCOM INTSUM sources the following documents for their assessment: CIA NID 1 May 2003, USSTRATCOM CS551 (CISO) Counterintelligence Highlights 2 May 2003, and NCIS Msg 302155Z Apr 03.

<sup>15</sup> TD-314/02527-04, TD-314/03608-04, Analyst Note: Perfume bottle is not currently held at JTF-GTMO.

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propaganda, and facilitated the movement of al-Qaida fighters and families fleeing from Afghanistan to Pakistan.

- (S//NF) Detainee facilitated travel and provided funds and equipment for 13 of the 19 hijackers involved in the 9/11 terrorist attack.
  - (S//NF) Detainee arranged for the hijackers' temporary lodging in the UAE and assisted with procuring visas, travel documents, bank accounts, and electronic equipment such as laptop computers and handheld translators. He also transferred funds to the hijackers<sup>16</sup> and sent care packages to them while they were in the US.
    - (S//NF) At the end of 1999, KSM asked detainee to wire money to Nawaf al-Hazmi, the American Airlines (AA) flight 77 hijacker, in the US.<sup>17</sup>
    - (S//NF) In mid-to-late 2000, detainee met and facilitated AA flight 175 hijacker Marwan al-Shehhi in the UAE, to include purchasing flight simulator software for his training.<sup>18</sup>
    - (S//NF) In late August 2000, detainee received \$120,000 USD from KSM to send to the US. On 29 August 2000 detainee sent \$20,000 USD via Western Union.<sup>19</sup> (Analyst Note: From the context of the report, the \$20,000 USD is assessed to have been part of the \$120,000 received from KSM.)
    - (S//NF) In November 2000,<sup>20</sup> detainee met with AA flight 77 hijacker pilot, Hani Hanjour, and arranged for Hanjour's travel. Detainee also assisted Hanjour in opening a bank account at Citibank in the UAE.<sup>21</sup>
    - (S//NF) From April to June 2001, detainee assisted the following hijackers while in the UAE and helped them travel to the US: Ahmad al-Ghamdi, Majed al-Moqed, Satam al-Suqami, Walid al-Shehri, Hamza al-Ghamdi, Ahmad al-Nami, Muhammad al-Shehri, Wail al-Shehri, Ahmed al-Haznawi, and Saeed al-Ghamdi.<sup>22</sup>
- (S//NF) Detainee worked closely with KSM planning operations against US and Allied targets to include: Heathrow International Airport, London, United Kingdom (UK); the US Consulate and several hotels in Karachi; the shoe-bombing attempt against American Airlines Flight 63; gas stations in the US; and unidentified targets in South East Asia (SEA).

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<sup>16</sup> TD-314/52606-05

<sup>17</sup> TD-314/52606-05

<sup>18</sup> TD-314/52606-05

<sup>19</sup> TD-314/52606-05

<sup>20</sup> Analyst Note: Detainee stated this occurred during Ramadan of 2000, which started on 28 November 2000.

<sup>21</sup> TD-314/52606-05, Analyst Note: On 28 January 2001, detainee deposited \$5,000 into Hanjour's BSC Bank account in Saudi Arabia.

<sup>22</sup> TD-314/52606-05

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- (S//NF) Detainee acted as the conduit for e-mail exchanges and messages possibly involving operational activity between KSM and Hambali.<sup>23</sup> After the arrest of KSM in March 2003, detainee intended to contact Hambali to offer his assistance and find out what resources were available for future operations.<sup>24</sup>
- (S//NF) Detainee became aware of the operation to attack London Heathrow in January 2003, but stated that operatives had not yet been selected to carry out the attacks. For his part, detainee intended to solicit the support, guidance, and assistance of senior al-Qaida operative Walid bin Attash, admitting that his own limited operational experience required the inclusion of a more seasoned operative, such as bin Attash, to accomplish a plan of such magnitude.<sup>25</sup> (Analyst Note: The Heathrow plot began in November 2002, when KSM assigned Abu Talha al-Pakistani to begin surveillance of Heathrow for a potential future operation. The plan called for crashing numerous airplanes into Heathrow, with a secondary explosion immediately outside of the airport as a diversion. This operation was put on hold upon KSM's arrest in February 2003.<sup>26</sup>)
- (S//NF) Detainee and Hamza Zubayr started the Karachi plot against the US Consulate and several hotels.<sup>27</sup> (Analyst Note: According to foreign government service sensitive reporting, the primary plan was to pack a small aircraft with explosives and crash it into the US Consulate.<sup>28</sup> Other potential targets for this plot included western residences and hotels, the Marriott Hotel in particular, due to its perceived lack of security.<sup>29</sup>)
  - (S//NF) In September 2002, KSM revamped the Karachi operation targeting the US Consulate, and brought in Walid bin Attash to work with detainee. After KSM's arrest, detainee then brought Walid bin Attash into the Heathrow operation.<sup>30</sup>
  - (S//NF) In October 2002, detainee met with Asif Zahir, the leader of a small unaffiliated extremist group in Pakistan,<sup>31</sup> who had 10 tons of ammonium nitrate explosives for use in the Karachi plot. Zahir was arrested after meeting with detainee. Detainee also met Jabir (NFI), who came to detainee and said he was

<sup>23</sup> Analyst Note: It is possible that al-Qaida had plans to assist the JI in plots on unidentified targets in South East Asia.

<sup>24</sup> TD-314/61768-03, TD-314/33612-03, TD-314/65937-03

<sup>25</sup> TD-314/61768-03

<sup>26</sup> TD-314/32629-03

<sup>27</sup> TD-314/09769-04

<sup>28</sup> STRATCOM INTSUM 01 MAY 2003, TD-314/25273-03

<sup>29</sup> NCIS MTAC Threat Assessment, 11 FEB 2004, Analyst Note: This plot was possibly related to earlier al-Qaida planning for attacks against U.S. military personnel in airport shuttles and U.S. military aircraft at the Karachi International Airport.

<sup>30</sup> TD-314/41802-03, TD-314/37948-04

<sup>31</sup> TD-314/36858-03

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keeping explosives for Hamza Zubayr (deceased). Detainee told him to wait and stay where he was until detainee contacted him.<sup>32</sup>

- (S//NF) From December 2002 to March 2003, detainee asked Jabir to obtain more explosives and to rent another house to make the explosives for the Karachi plot. Detainee then arranged for operatives to conduct surveillance of the Karachi airport and routes to the US Consulate. On the day detainee and Walid bin Attash were supposed to receive the explosives, they were both arrested.<sup>33</sup>
- (S//NF) Detainee met with Atta Rahman aka (Qassim) aka (Altaf) and Hudayfa aka (Amin) aka (Lee Carter), and tasked Hudayfa with collecting information about the Airport Hotel in Karachi.<sup>34</sup>
  - (S//NF) Detainee was the handler for both shoe bombers, Richard Reid and Dhiren Barot aka (Issa al-Britani<sup>35</sup>).<sup>36</sup>
  - (S//NF) Detainee, along with Saifullah Paracha, ISN US9PK-001094DP (PK-1094), Aafia Siddiqui,<sup>37</sup> Issa al-Britani, and Majid Khan, attempted to set up a cover business in the US to import explosives.<sup>38</sup> Detainee and KSM designated Majid Khan as an operative for a plot to target gas stations in the United States.<sup>39</sup>
- (S//NF) Detainee received money via couriers and facilitated numerous money transfers to and from KSM.
  - (S//NF) In late May or early June 2002, detainee passed approximately \$17,241 USD from Abu Ahmad to KSM via Maqsood Khan Oyam Khani Khan.<sup>40</sup>
  - (S//NF) In June 2002, funds from outside Pakistan arrived intermittently by courier for KSM. The couriers would contact detainee on his cell phone, and he would meet them in a public place and accept the funds. Detainee would then contact

<sup>32</sup> TD-314/52606-05, TD-314/08201-04

<sup>33</sup> TD-314/52606-05, TD-314/08201-04

<sup>34</sup> TD-314/09769-04

<sup>35</sup> TD-314/63151-03

<sup>36</sup> TD-314/52270-03

<sup>37</sup> TD-314/32873-03, Analyst note: Aafia Siddiqui, a female, holds a B.S. degree in biology from MIT. Detainee had informed Siddiqui that a laboratory had been set up to produce biological agents. Siddiqui reportedly told detainee that she was willing to participate in a Biological Weapons (BW) project if al-Qaida tasked her to do so. Detainee stated that after their conversation, he never tasked Siddiqui to participate in the BW project and never considered to let her work in the laboratory. TD-314/14243-05

<sup>38</sup> TD-314/30874-03

<sup>39</sup> The Terrorist Threat to Maritime Related US Critical Infrastructure 12 NOV 02, Analyst Note: It is more likely that KSM's actual intent was to target oil refineries in the US, which would make a larger impact. Al-Qaida senior lieutenant Abu Zubaydah indicated that al-Qaida would target major petroleum shipping centers and major petroleum refineries, which would probably cripple the US way of life, additionally serving the goals of al-Qaida.

<sup>40</sup> TD-314/34749-03, Analyst Note: Maqsood Khan Oyam Khani Khan is commonly referred to as simply Maqsood Khan.

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Mansur aka (Hassan al-Pakistani), detainee's aide, who would pass the money to Maqsood Khan. Maqsood would then hold the money for KSM.<sup>41</sup>

- (S//NF) During June 2002 and early 2003, KSM tasked detainee on several occasions with passing messages to Maqsood requesting funds be sent to Peshawar, PK, and gave detainee the name of a person to whom Maqsood was to send the money. (Analyst Note: Transaction sizes varied from \$8,625 to \$25,675 USD equivalent.)<sup>42</sup>
- (S//NF) In November 2002, detainee met a courier named Ilyas in Karachi near Hassan Square to receive a delivery of 40 Lakh (Analyst Note: \$69,000 USD) for KSM.<sup>43</sup>
  - ◆ (S//NF) Ilyas also provided detainee assistance on occasion with moving families to Quetta from Karachi.<sup>44</sup>
- (S//NF) Detainee and KSM gave PK-1094 a total of \$500,000 USD of al-Qaida money in early 2002 for "safekeeping." KSM used PK-1094's capabilities as a well-known Pakistani businessman to conduct money-laundering operations and purchase real estate to be used as al-Qaida safe houses.
  - (S//NF) In July 2002, detainee and KSM brought the money in cash to PK-1094's office separately. KSM brought \$270,000 USD one day; and the next day, detainee brought \$230,000 USD, wrapped in newspaper and cellophane and carried in a shopping bag.<sup>45</sup>
  - (S//NF) In November 2002, KSM requested detainee to initiate the retrieval of \$500,000 USD from PK-1094. After meeting with PK-1094 several times, detainee eventually arranged for a courier to pick up the money in January or February 2003.<sup>46</sup>
- (S//NF) In December 2002, detainee arranged for a \$50,000 USD money transfer from KSM to Hambali.<sup>47</sup>
  - (S//NF) Majid Khan's uncle, Maqsood Khan Qyam Khani, arranged for the financial transfer from Pakistan to Bangkok where Majid Khan was to pick the money up from a Hawala office.<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>41</sup> TD-314/34398-03

<sup>42</sup> TD-314/34398-03

<sup>43</sup> TD-314/34398-03, TD-314/36317-03, Analyst Note: Lakh is a unit of measurement used on the Indian sub-continent equal to 100,000 Pakistani Rupees or \$1,725 USD. In this instance, 40 Lakh would be 4,000,000 Pakistani Rupees, equal to approximately \$69,000 USD in July 2002.

<sup>44</sup> TD-314/36317-03

<sup>45</sup> IIR 4 201 0340 05

<sup>46</sup> TD-314/45509-03, TD-314/57980-05, IIR 4 201 0340 05

<sup>47</sup> TD-314/32870-03

<sup>48</sup> TD-314/48473-03

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- (S//NF) Detainee used Majid Khan to courier the funds in Bangkok, Thailand (TH), and deliver them to Hambali's representative, Mohd Farik Bin Amin variant (Mohammed Farik bin Amin) aka (Zubair).<sup>49</sup>
- (S//NF) Detainee is affiliated with UBL and numerous other high level al-Qaida members. After the 9/11 attacks in 2001, detainee attended a meeting in Kandahar, AF, with UBL and other senior members of al-Qaida.<sup>50</sup> The meeting consisted of approximately 20 people, including UBL, KSM, Sayf al-Adl, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Abu Khayr al-Masri, Shaykh Said al-Masri and Sulayman Abu Ghayth. Detainee also thought that Abu Faraj al-Libi and Abd al-Rahman BM were there too.<sup>51</sup> (Analyst Note: It is unclear what the "BM" stands for after al-Rahman's name. It is possibly a designator or special skill.) The meeting lasted for two hours and discussed possible US military response to the attacks.<sup>52</sup>
- (S//NF) Detainee facilitated and was part of the production for al-Qaida media propaganda.
  - (S//NF) From early 2002 until April 2003, detainee worked closely with the al-Qaida media committee officials from his base in Karachi.<sup>53</sup>
  - (S//NF) Detainee was responsible for passing UBL's written messages to Abu Khubayb's group, who ran a website sympathetic to al-Qaida and Islamic extremism in the UK.<sup>54</sup> Detainee did this through Karachi-based operatives, Abu Talha and Tamwir aka (Adnan) aka (Khurram).<sup>55</sup>
  - (S//NF) Detainee also admitted to being personally responsible for the publication of two of the four UBL media products published since 9/11.
    - (S//NF) "Why We Fight," the first product after the 9/11 attacks, which the detainee passed to Abu Talha who forwarded it via internet to Abu Khubayb with carbon copies forwarded to Sayf al-Battar al-Sharqi aka (Swift Sword), Ahmad Muwaffaq Zaydan, and the al-Jazeera network's headquarters in Qatar.<sup>56</sup>

<sup>49</sup> TD-314/32870-03, Analyst Note: Detainee sent Majid Khan all the way to Bangkok, TH, to retrieve funds from a hawala, who could have easily provided the money directly to Hambali's representative. PK-1094 also frequently made travels into Bangkok "to go on a purchasing trip for his company." "Hawala" is a banker, using an underground banking system based on trust, whereby money can be made available internationally without actually moving it or leaving a record of transaction; terrorists make frequent use of the hawala system.

<sup>50</sup> TD-314/33397-03

<sup>51</sup> TD-314/33397-03

<sup>52</sup> TD-314/33397-03

<sup>53</sup> TD-314/34375-03

<sup>54</sup> TD-314/32873-03

<sup>55</sup> TD-314/34375-03


<sup>56</sup> TD-314/60443-03

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- (S//NF) The “9/11 Anniversary Video” product, which Abu Faraj al-Libi forwarded to detainee in June or July 2002, to hold for publication until 11 September 2002.<sup>57</sup>
  - ◆ (S//NF) Detainee passed this video to the media group official, Abu Rahman al-Maghribi, who combined the video with the “Will of Martyrs” video and returned it to the detainee in approximately August 2002.<sup>58</sup>
  - ◆ (S//NF) In early September 2002, detainee gave the video to Abu Musab al-Baluchi, who delivered it to the al-Jazeera office in Islamabad, PK, and phoned their al-Jazeera correspondent, Zaydan, to advise him the tape had been delivered.<sup>59</sup>
- (S//NF) Detainee admits that in early 2002 he used PK-1094’s company, Universal Broadcasting, in Karachi to produce a video. Detainee states it was for a different video highlighting Bakr al-Azdi’s experiences in Tora Bora.<sup>60</sup>
- (S//NF) Detainee facilitated movement of al-Qaida fighters and their families out of Afghanistan and in to Pakistan.<sup>61</sup>
  - (S//NF) Detainee set up several safe houses along with other al-Qaida members, including Abu Badr aka (Muhammad Hasan Ghulam Rabbani), ISN US9PK-001460DP.<sup>62</sup>
  - (S//NF) Detainee stated the finances for the movement of these families came from Shaykh Said aka (Mustafa Ahmad Muhammad Uthman Abu al-Yazid), al-Qaida’s senior financial officer.<sup>63</sup>

c. (U//FOUO) **Detainee’s Conduct:** Detainee detention threat level is assessed as MEDIUM based on a DoD initial 90-day observation.

  
for HARRY B. HARRIS, JR.  
Rear Admiral, US Navy  
Commanding

BG, US Army  
DEPUTY COMMANDER

<sup>57</sup> TD-314/60443-03

<sup>58</sup> TD-314/60443-03

<sup>59</sup> TD-314/60443-03

<sup>60</sup> TD-314/01450-05, Analyst Note: It is likely that PK-1094’s company also produced the 9/11 videos.

<sup>61</sup> TD-314/59833-03

<sup>62</sup> TD-314/59833-03

<sup>63</sup> TD-314/59833-03